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ARGUMENT 
L THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT 
ARTICLE I, § 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION DOES NOT 
PROTECT THE RIGHT OF ALL CITIZENS TO POSSESS A 
FIREARM 
Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution affirmatively declares that "[t]he 
individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, 
family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms." However, the pertinent portion of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a) 
reads that any category I restricted person who "purchases, transfers, possesses, uses or 
has under his custody or control any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony" 
(emphasis added). Willis asserts that this statute unconstitutionally interferes with one's 
right to keep and bear arms because while the legislature is granted authority to define 
the use of arms, it does not have the authority to prevent one to possess arms. The 
legislature affirmed the critical distinction between usage and possession of a firearm in 
the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a). 
A. The Court of Appeals erroneously relied on State v. In and 
erroneously concluding that Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) 
does not violate the plain language of Article I, § 6 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The State asserts that State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, 18 P.3d 500, is controlling 
and that the Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Willis, 2002 UT App 229, 52 P.3d 
461, correctly relied on State v. In and correctly determined that Willis has no right to 
posses a firearm under Article I, § 6 (Brief of Appellee at 7). However, In is not 
controlling for the following reasons: (1) the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated § 
76-10-503(2)(a) was not at issue; (2) the defendant in In actually used a firearm rather 
than merely possessing it; and (3) the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on outdated 
case law in finding that the statute was constitutional. In, 2002 UT App 358, at tTs 2, 
3, n.2, 14. 
In involved a defendant who plead guilty to drive-by shooting and before being 
sentenced for that crime, he was involved in another shootout. 2002 UT App 358, at 
\2. The defendant was convicted for possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person and appealed arguing that he was not a "restricted person" as defined in Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). Id. at 11. The defendant's appeal was based on 
the following narrow issues: "In the context of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i), is 
one 'convicted' who has pleaded guilty ... but has not yet been sentenced and a 
judgment of conviction has not yet been entered?", and in the alternative whether a 
conviction under § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) "interferes with one's right to bear arms." Id. at 
11's3,6. 
The Court of Appeals dismissed the first claim and determined that "convicted" 
refers to a "plea or verdict of guilt, and not to a judgment of conviction." Id. at %. 
And although the Court of Appeals found that § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) "only restricts [the 
right to keep and bear arms] under very limited circumstances—such as a felony 
indictment or conviction, the Court of Appeals relied on pre-1984 case law such as 
State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 1974). See Id. at f 14 (original emphasis). 
In the present case, In is not controlling because Willis challenges the facial 
validity of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503(2)(a), whereas the defendant in In 
challenged the definition of "convicted" as it related to § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i). 
Moreover, Willis's challenge is based on the issue of whether § 76-10-503(2)(a) is 
unconstitutional on its face because it infringes on the individual right to bear and keep 
arms and makes mere possession of a firearm by a restricted person a crime. The 
defendant in In did not raise a facial challenge to the statute, but rather argued that he 
was simply not a "restricted person" because he was not yet convicted for the first 
shooting. Id. at j l , 3 n.2. Thus the defendant's argument was based on the 
interpretation of the word "convicted" and not on whether § 76-10-503(2)(a) is 
unconstitutional because it denies restricted persons the right to possess arms. 
Additionally, In is not controlling because it is factually distinguishable. While 
the defendant in In actually used a firearm arm to shoot someone and was convicted on 
this, Willis was convicted for merely possessing a firearm; he did not use it against 
. anyone. See In, 2000 UT App 358, at 1f1's 1-2. 
Furthermore, In is not controlling because pre-1984 case law is not on point and 
not dispositive of this issue. State v. Beorchia was decided in 1974, and at that time 
Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution only guaranteed a collective right to bear arms. 
See State v. Ylacil, 645 P.2d 677, 679 (1982). During the years leading up to 1984, 
the Utah legislature was concerned that Article I, § 6 of the Utah Constitution only 
protected the collective right of a state "militia" and not the rights of individuals to 
possess firearms. See House Debate on Senate Resolution No. 2, dated March 7, 1983 
(R. 84-94). This concern was based on the fact that the United States Supreme Court 
recently held that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected only the 
collective right to bear arms, and not the individual right to bear arms. See Vlacil, 645 
P.2d at 679. In order to secure the individual right to bear arms, the Utah Legislature 
proposed amendmeuts to Article I, § 6 and the electorate approved the current version 
of Article I, § 6. See M. Truman Hunt, The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory 
Pacifier?, 4 Utah L.Rev. 751, 751-755 (1986). Now, Article I, § 6 guarantees the 
individual right to keep and bear arms; thus, the Court of Appeals reliance on pre-1984 
case law is misplaced. 
B. The plain language of Article I, §6 confers an individual right to bear 
arms. 
The State claims that the current amended version of Article I, § 6 authorizes the 
legislature to deny individuals the right to lawfully posses arms (Brief of Appellee at 8). 
The State further asserts that Article I, § 6 should be interpreted broadly in order to 
avoid "a hyper-technical and overly restrictive reading" of the Utah Constitution (Brief 
of Appellee at 8). Willis asserts that the plain language of Article I, § 6 confers an 
individual right to bear arms and prevents the legislature from limiting or restricting an 
individual's right to possess and keep firearms. 
"In considering the meaning of a constitutional provisional, a court must begin 
its analysis with the plain language of the provision and need not look beyond the plain 
language unless some ambiguity is found." Utah School Boards Ass'n v. Utah State Bd. 
Of Education, 2001 UT 2, 113, 17 P.3d 1125. 
As set forth above and in the original brief, the current version of Article I, § 6 
was amended in order to overcome the prevailing view that the Second Amendment 
guaranteed only a collective right to bear arms as opposed to an individual right to bear 
arms (Brief of Appellant at 9-10). Article I, § 6 now specifically guarantees "[t]he 
individual right of the people to keep and bear arms" and only allows the legislature to 
"define the lawful use of arms". 
The State argues that "use" and "possess" have essentially the same meaning 
(Brief of Appellee at 9). However, the language of Article I, § 6 is plain and 
unambiguous in that the legislature does not have the right to restrict individual 
possession of arms. Thus, Article I, § 6 prevents the legislature from limiting or 
restricting an individual's right to possess arms. For these reasons, Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-10-503 (2) (a) is unconstitutional as it violates the plain language of 
Article I, § 6 and denies a Category I restricted person from possessing a firearm. 
The State also argues that this Court should not find Utah Code Annotated § 76-
10-503(2)(a) unconstitutional in order to avoid unfavorable results, namely that 
criminals would have the right to possess guns (Brief of Appellee at 10-11). However, 
Willis asserts that while many may deem the plain language of Article I, § 6 unwise, 
the Utah Constitution establishes the individual right to possess firearms. 
By arguing that "use" and "possession" are essentially the same terms, the 
State's argument makes the rights declared in Article I, § 6 an empty shell for all Utah 
citizens. There is no constitutional right to for individuals "to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property ... as well as other lawful 
purposes" if the legislature can circumscribe this right by restricting individuals the 
right to possess guns. Clearly, Article I, § 6 only authorizes the legislature to define 
"the lawful use of aims" and does not authorize the legislature to void that individual 
right altogether. 
C. The 1984 amendment to Article I, § 6 did not give the legislature 
authority to deny individuals the right to possess firearms. 
The State further claims that a review of the history of Article I, § 6 supports its 
position. However, the history of Article I, § 6 in its current form is clear that it was 
intended to confer an individual right as opposed to a collective right to bear arms. 
Thus, the State's position and the Court of Appeals' conclusion in State v. Willis, 2002 
UT App 229, is incorrect. 
The State cites a colloquy in the House regarding a proposed amendment to 
Article I, § 6, with one representative stating that the proposed amendment would not 
preclude legislation against felons (Brief of Appellee at 12). However, this proposed 
amendment was rejected and is not the version we have today (R. 78, 84). Thus, the 
State's argument here is irrelevant. 
The State also cites the Voter Information Pamphlet prepared to inform Utahans 
about Article I, § 6 in order to show that this amendment would allow the legislature to 
restrict felons the right to bear arms (Brief of Appellee at 13). However, the State fails 
to mention that the very same Voter Information Pamphlet warned that this proposed 
amendment guaranteed "broad individual liberties and protected the enjoyment of those 
liberties from infringement" (Brief of Appellant at 10). Further, there was considerable 
debate in the legislature that the proposed amendment would clearly protect the 
individual right to bear arms and would "considerably undermine law enforcement." 4 
UtahL.Rev. at 752 n. 13. 
Moreover, the mere fact that certain classes of individuals have been historically 
excluded from the right to bear arms is not germane to this issue because this 
amendment was specifically enacted to protect against governmental interference with 
the right to bear arms. See 4 Utah L.Rev. at 751-755. 
Thus, the State's claim that the legislative history shows legislative intent to 
restrict possession of firearms by felons is not supported by history. Moreover, the 
language of Article I, § 6 is unambiguous and this Court does not need to look beyond 
the plain language to resolve this issue. 
Is sum, Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-503 (2)(a) is unconstitutional on its face 
because it infringes on the right of individuals-including Willis~to merely "possess" 
firearms. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Willis asks 
this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and on the ground that the 
statute which makes it unlawful for a restricted person to merely possess a firearm 
violates his individual right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution. Willis further asks that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District 
Court with instructions that his plea is to be withdrawn, and the matter dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this H_ day of September, 2003. 
Margaret P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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